ZeroTrace Echo
Rolling-Code Handling
Echo captures and classifies rolling-code remotes, it never decrypts them and never replays them.
Rolling-Code Handling
Rolling-code remotes change their code on every press, using a secret manufacturer key. Echo treats them as read-only: it can capture them, identify the make, and break out the readable parts, but it never decrypts the changing security part and never replays them.
The rolling security code is never decrypted, Echo holds no manufacturer keys and is designed so it can never gain a way to transmit a rolling-code remote. Replay, the standalone button, and automation rules all refuse rolling-code signals. This is a deliberate limit, not a missing feature.
Reference: what Echo shows per scheme
| KeeLoq (HCS-family) | Serial number and button read in plain. The rolling security code itself is shown only as an opaque block, never decrypted. |
| Somfy RTS | Address, button/command name (Up, Down, My/Stop, Prog, and combinations), and the rolling counter value read in plain. |
| Security+ (v1) | Chamberlain / LiftMaster Security+ 1.0, recognised and field-split like KeeLoq and Somfy above. |
| Security+ (v2) | Chamberlain / LiftMaster Security+ 2.0, recognised and field-split like KeeLoq and Somfy above. |
| CAME Atomo | Recognised by make and captured, no field breakdown. |
| Nice FloR-S | Recognised by make and captured, no field breakdown. |
| FAAC SLH | Recognised by make and captured, no field breakdown. |
| AN-Motors | Recognised by make and captured, no field breakdown. |
| Genie | Recognised by make and captured, no field breakdown. |
So while a remote like Somfy RTS or KeeLoq is broken down in detail, CAME Atomo, Nice FloR-S, FAAC SLH, AN-Motors and Genie are recognised by make only. In every case the remote is captured and classified, never defeated.
What "field-split" actually means
For the four detailed makes, Echo separates a capture into the parts that are safe and useful to read, without ever touching the part that provides the security:
| Serial / address | The fixed identifier for that specific remote, unchanged press to press |
| Button / command | Which button was pressed, shown by name for Somfy (Up, Down, My/Stop, Prog, Sun+Flag, Flag, and two-button combinations) |
| Rolling counter | Somfy's press counter, increments every press, readable in plain text on the wire |
| Hopping / security code | KeeLoq's encrypted portion, shown only as an opaque block, this is what actually authorises the door or gate and is never decrypted |
KeeLoq's hopping code is encrypted with a manufacturer key that isn't public and that Echo doesn't have. There's no partial decode to offer, and building a path toward one is explicitly designed against, not just left undone.
Because Echo can recognise a rolling-code remote and spot a duplicate of one, it can power the RollJam detector, warning you that a rolling remote may have been captured, without ever needing to break its security.