Skip to content

ZeroTrace OSINT

TLS Inspector

Full certificate chain, cipher suites, TLS versions, OCSP, CRL, JA3S/JA4S fingerprints, and sibling-hostname lookup.

The TLS inspector connects to a host on port 443 (or any TLS-enabled port) and reads the entire TLS handshake and certificate chain. It then enriches the result with sibling-hostname lookups from certificate transparency, OCSP / CRL endpoint inspection, and a security grade based on the negotiated parameters.

What you get

SectionWhat it surfaces
Negotiated parametersTLS version, cipher suite, key exchange, MAC, named curve
Cipher security breakdownPer-cipher score with forward-secrecy, AEAD, quantum-vulnerability flags
Certificate chainEvery cert from leaf to root with subject, issuer, SAN list, key algorithm and size, validity dates, fingerprints
Leaf certificate flagsSelf-signed, expired, expiring soon, weak key, weak signature algorithm
OCSP staplingWhether the server staples an OCSP response, plus the OCSP responder URL
CRL distribution pointsURLs for certificate revocation lists
HSTS / Expect-CT headersRead from a sibling HTTPS GET against the same host
JA3S / JA4S server fingerprintCryptographic fingerprint of the server's TLS handshake response
Sibling hostnamesOther hostnames found on certificates issued for the same leaf — auto-pulled from CT
Security gradeComposite A+ / A / B / C / D / F based on TLS version, cipher, cert validity, OCSP, HSTS

TLS version + cipher

The negotiated parameters tell you the minimum a client could negotiate with this server. The breakdown shows:

  • TLS version — 1.3 (modern), 1.2 (acceptable), 1.1 / 1.0 (deprecated), SSL 3 (broken).
  • Cipher suite — full string, plus per-component flags.
  • Forward secrecy — does the cipher provide it? (ECDHE / DHE = yes, RSA key exchange = no.)
  • Authenticated encryption — does the cipher provide AEAD? (GCM, CHACHA20-POLY1305 = yes, CBC = no.)
  • Quantum-vulnerable — does the cipher rely on key exchange that quantum computers can break? (Pre-PQC anything = yes.)

Certificate chain

Each certificate in the chain shows on its own card:

  • Subject, issuer, validity period (with the freshness chip for expiry urgency).
  • Subject Alternative Names (the full SAN list).
  • Public key algorithm + size (RSA-2048, EC P-256, etc.).
  • Signature algorithm (SHA256-RSA, ECDSA-SHA384, etc.).
  • Fingerprints (SHA1, SHA256).

Chain validity (does the chain build to a trusted root) is checked. If a cert in the chain is missing or expired, the tool flags it.

OCSP and CRL

For each certificate, the tool extracts:

  • OCSP responder URL — and pings it to confirm the cert is not revoked.
  • CRL distribution points — listed (the CRLs themselves are large; the tool lists the URLs without fetching).
  • OCSP stapling — whether the server includes a stapled OCSP response in the handshake (faster, more private than a separate OCSP query).

JA3S / JA4S fingerprints

JA3S and JA4S are cryptographic hashes of the server's TLS handshake response. They are useful for:

  • Identifying common TLS stacks. A given JA3S maps to "Cloudflare's TLS termination," "Apache 2.4 with default config," "nginx 1.21 default," etc.
  • Spotting infrastructure clusters. Two completely different domains with the same JA3S share their TLS termination — same operator, very probably.
  • Detecting impersonation. A site that claims to be Bank X but has Bank Y's JA3S was set up by someone copying configurations rather than running the genuine stack.

JA3S / JA4S is one of the few attribution signals an attacker cannot trivially fake without rebuilding their TLS stack. For phishing-domain investigation, finding multiple suspicious domains with the same JA4S is a strong infrastructure-cluster signal.

Sibling hostnames from CT

The leaf certificate's serial number gets cross-referenced with certificate transparency logs. The tool returns:

  • Other hostnames covered by the same certificate. SAN list.
  • Other certificates that covered the leaf hostname. Renewal history.
  • Other certificates from the same issuer for the same hostname. Reissues.

This is the same cross-pivot you would do manually with crt.sh, automated.

HSTS and Expect-CT

A separate HTTPS GET on the host fetches the security headers. The tool surfaces:

  • HSTS max-age and whether it includes subdomains.
  • Whether HSTS is preload-eligible.
  • Expect-CT settings (deprecated but still useful as a signal).

Alternate-port probing

A toggle attempts the same TLS inspection on alternate ports (8443, 9443, 10443) commonly used for admin panels behind TLS. Useful for finding "we forgot we still expose this" panels.

Pivots

Click on...Pivot to
The hostnameSite analysis, DNS, certificate transparency, subdomain discovery, Wayback
Sibling hostnameTLS inspector (recursive), site analysis
OCSP / CRL URLURL parser
Issuer nameCertificate transparency for "all leafs from this issuer for this domain"
Cert fingerprint(no pivot — copy and search externally)

Sources

  • Direct TLS handshake against the target host.
  • crt.sh for sibling-hostname cross-reference.
  • The OCSP responder named in each certificate (when stapling is off).
  • A bundled cipher security catalog and key-algorithm catalog.

Every external source is named on the result.

Command Palette

Search for a command to run...